I would like to bring Taiwan more into the discussion between EU-China. It’s a difficult one to have. Again, thank you for taking time to meet me. I really look forward to our conversation with your views.

Sure. Let’s get started.

As you could see it in my card, I also work for 9DashLine, which is a digital platform that covers EU, that aims at connecting Europe with democracies in the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan is one of our major focus.

While I am here, I am trying to connect us more, to help Europeans get a better understanding of Taiwan and the regional dynamics, and also, hopefully, contribute to Taiwanese scholars, or experts, or think tankers in civil society to understand Europe better.

I sent my questions. Maybe we can stick to those, more or less. It doesn’t matter. It can be flexible.

It’s fine. I’m fine either way. I got the questions, but feel free to reorder, expand, rotate, translate, scale. [laughs] However you wish.

Thank you. I would first of all be interested in you and in your work as a digital minister in charge of social innovation. I think already, though, your title has four different elements in it, and if you could expand…

It’s not even my full title. [laughs]

I’m sorry. I didn’t mean to reduce it to just…

It’s also open government, youth engagement…

Of course. All of that. If you could expand on, how do you see your role as a digital minister in charge of social innovation and much more?

Much more?

Indeed. It’s been four years now, right?

Yeah, sure.

With this pandemic happening, and as we see the global dynamics around that, how do you see this role, and what are your ambitions in the near future with everything that you were provided as tools and your capacity to innovate beyond that?

My ambition is very plain on my card. It says “Taiwan can help.” [laughs]

Taiwan is helping.

Yes. “Taiwan is helping.” I’ve had that card for the past three years now, except the back side changes every year because the MOFA designates different priorities. It used to look like this on the first year, which is a focus more on the sustainability of circular economy and the agricultural technologies that Taiwan is, of course, very well known.

The next year’s card…

…focused on this collecting card game…

I’ll keep them all.

…focused on the ocean, like marine debris management, plastic waste management, and all the climate change mitigation. That’s the two colors.

Understandably, though, this year, we focused far more not only on health but also on pretty much everything. It’s like a kaleidoscope. I think the design is more like a kaleidoscope this year, which is the one I just gave you. [laughs]

Which means that in our end, each of the 17 global goals, we’re now much more confident that we can help and that we are helping. This is about expanding Taiwan’s traditional international role of whereas previously, as I mentioned, it was about agricultural technology. It’s about marine debris, circular economy, climate change mitigation. That’s pretty much it.

Nowadays, we also expand to other SDGs, including the 16s, like open government and digital governance. The 17s, which is what everybody is talking about now, is the data norms. That’s the 17s. Broadband as human rights, that’s the 9s, and so on.

I would say that we’re going not only about bilateral relationships that’s focused on mutual aid and in Taiwan’s case, mostly about the countries that are – more resemble us but 30 years ago, but nowadays, with countries that resemble us but maybe three years in the future.

That’s a very different configuration, and I think digital helps not only mutual accountability but also the very important thing about norm-shaping, which is also a core EU concern – about how to make the chapter in the GDPR that nobody understands the joint data controllership – how to actually make it work.

There’s various propositions like data unions, data trusts, data coalitions, data cooperatives. I can say maybe 10 more. [laughs] The core idea is how not to fall to authoritarian intelligence on one side and to surveillance capitalism on the other. That, we can also help.

That’s my ambition. I think it’s also an ambition for the EU as well.

Yes, indeed. The norm-shaping is at the core of the EU’s identity as a normative power. This has been challenged for quite a while, especially with China’s increasing aspirations or ambitions to shape norms themselves.

Also surveillance capitalists’ increasing ambition, so these two. I often say it’s like an Eurasian Plate on one side and the Philippine Sea plate on the other. They bump into each other. We’ve experienced earthquakes. [laughs]

Let’s talk about the Taiwan model in that context. Not only in Europe but worldwide, I think Taiwan is getting more and more attention because of its successful way of containing the virus and beyond not just domestically doing such a great job to protect the health of the people but to help others. You’ve seen, I think it was in April, that the president…

The president. Yes.

…she also refer the line. She tweeted that she was…

Yeah, I saw the tweet.

…Taiwan for the millions of masks that we’ve received. I think it is going to be crucial for the future how to maintain the momentum and how the Taiwan model can actually go beyond the global health component, because the way I see the Taiwan model as such, I see a lot of elements to it.

You’ve already discussed some of the elements. I also would like to talk about the public trust element and how you see the Taiwan model to be able to become a soft power tool for Taiwan.

We didn’t send those masks to her, [laughs] but that’s part of the soft power too.

Yeah. That would be the clip. If you could maybe speak a little bit about the Taiwan model in the context of fighting the virus because, I think, at the moment, as you see what is happening in Europe, in Belgium, it is heartbreaking for the people but also, in a way, shameful for democracies to fail at such a scale.

If you could tell me how you think Taiwan can promote the innovations in the Taiwan model, describe the model, and maybe identify some elements that can be picked out of the model, that can serve as a soft power tool for Taiwan.

You mentioned the virus, but there’s two virus simultaneously. There’s virus of the body, which is SARS 2.0, and there’s virus of the mind, which is the info damning conspiracy theories and so on. These two are intertwined.

When people buy into conspiracy theories, then they become less capable of acting in the way that helps the scientific knowledge that could prevent the epidemic in the first place.

On the other hand, if the government sees the citizen as not trustworthy, maybe because they buy into conspiracy theories, and impose very stringent top-down lockdown, takedown, shutdown procedures, then that actually makes the conspiracy theory even louder because people, understandably, see that this is a move toward grabbing state power.

People would rebel for anything that’s top down or new data collection that violates the norm before the pandemic and things like that. I’m just saying these two have this vicious cycle dynamic going on.

Underlying both into the Taiwan model is an idea if the government trusts the citizens, then there is no false dilemma between freedom and human right on one side and public health, either mental or physical, on the other side. This false dilemma only appears if the state wants to do everything.

For example, in early February, we understood that if three-quarter of people wear the mask and wash their hands, then the virus will not replicate, the R value will be under one. Now you see it grows peaks everywhere. That’s not because of any top-down measure. It is because we made sure that the cute “spokesdog,” Zongchai, explains the science.

In a way, that incentivizes people based on the idea that you wear the mask to protect yourself against your own unwashed hands, which is an entirely individualistic incentive and, thereby, easier to spread than the collectivist incentive, like you do this to avoid a fine or you do this to respect your elders, which is very difficult to fly.

Getting the incentives right, be very iterative, like anyone calling 1922 gets the science explained to them in a very empathetic way. Their ideas, if knew, they can be amplified on the very next days, so interactively commonsense live stream. The fast iteration enables collective intelligence.

The fair distribution enables this mutual accountability. People queuing in line can take into account the mask availability map so that people queuing before them, when they swipe their national insurance card and get 9 or 10 masks, the people queuing after them can indeed see that system is working without any top-down surveillance or control.

Finally, it’s fun. There’s nothing fun about COVID, but there’s everything fun about, for example, this cute “spokesdog,” our head of the cabinet showing his bottoms and say that it doesn’t pay to stockpile, saying that, “There’s a lot of instant noodles. Buy as much as you want, but don’t forget your vegetables.”

All this put a stop to conspiracy theories and panic buying. That really, really worked. That’s called “humor over rumor.”

I think all these individual elements are easy to adapt in other jurisdictions. Taiwan model is not a one-size-fits-all thing. It’s rather a very gentle idea that if government trusts their citizens more, citizens can innovate better than governments. Then we apply it in various ways – fast, fear, and fun.

Speaking about Europe and Taiwan, you said you had a quick look at the piece that I wrote.

Yeah, I did… and not so “quickly”.

I read it quite carefully.

Thank you so much. I appreciate it. I also published a similar article in the “Taipei Times.” That was about a month or two months ago. We worked together with other fellows in the fellowship program. We really advocate for a stronger look at Taiwan and also, for example, Europe and India to work together to embrace Taiwan.

With Taiwan’s profound rise, and having read my article, and also being so well informed about global dynamics and global sentiment on China’s assertiveness, especially in an European context, and since we speak about infodemic and conspiracy theory.

I think this is one of the elements that has contributed to a sharp rise in European minds on the implications of such an increased presence of Chinese actors and state-owned enterprises, state-backed actors on our soil.

Because in the past 10 years, Europe has had a rough time, especially after 2008 financial crisis. Then you see the migration crisis, and also integration, Brexit, so many things that has sharpened divisions and deepened divisions within European countries but also gave China almost an opportunity to step in.

They were very skillful in recognizing the financial problems but also political crisis and identity crisis. In all that context with China’s influence rising in Europe, we’ve also established some very interesting tools to fight against misinformation and disinformation and also to explain…

Yeah, I’ve read the EUvsDisinfo.

Exactly. That’s one. Then, because I’m not an expert in this field, but I’ve done some research on our programs, we have the East StratCom in the External Action Service. That’s focusing on Russia’s attempts to undermine us.

We also have the European Digital Media Observatory project, which is a hub for fact-checkers and academics. We have the 2018 EU Action Plan against disinformation, so lots of different tools.

I think this is a good indication that we are converging. Do you think this could be an area that Europe could learn more from Taiwan?

Definitely. Yes.

How would you assess our approach to Taiwan at the moment as an European approach, knowing that the European Union is not a country but 27 countries, and it’s much more difficult to work with, much more complex? Where do you see that we could work closer together?

You mean…?

At the EU…

At the short term or in the long term, like us switching to euro?

That would be an interesting and innovative idea. Short term, medium term, long term. People to people, beyond health, all these elements.

I wasn’t entirely joking about switching to euro, though, because I do see that our data norms are very compatible. You probably would struggle to find a more European data norm in this part of Indo-Pacific. Although, of course, the fiat probably cannot be converted to euro anytime soon.

When we’re working on digital currencies, that is to the digital fiats, then the norm around…For example, in Taiwan, our central bank is planning a research on exactly that, a digital fiat. They designed a system. I think one of the design criteria is that unless you’re wiring money-laundering level of a lot of money, all transactions must be anonymous, just like cash.

You will not find that norm not only in PRC but in many nearby Indo-Pacific regions because they do think that more state intelligence is a good thing and not instrumental is a net good thing, like core value.

I would easily imagine that from the European single economy, nobody wants the central digital fiat to know all the shopping adverts of all European citizens. I think our systems are compatible. Although we may not call it euro, if the algorithmic governance is the same principle, then it might as well be compatible, like interchangeable. I think it’s a very concrete thing we can work on.

It also has very similar applications when it comes to disinfo. In Taiwan, we look at the fact-checking organizations. We make sure that we empower them. We have this idea called social sector, which is gaining currency in EU as well. Of course, various EU countries use different terms. Some say civil society organizations and so on, which is a banned term in PRC, by the way. [laughs] You can’t even say civil society organizations there.

The empowerment of social sector really is at the core of the Taiwan counter-disinformation playbook. If we say that the state can take down anything, hate speech, you name it, then the journalists and fact-checkers have no way to expand their reach on that particular regard, because then it will be something between the surveillance capitalists and the state. It will be a kind of bargain, but then the social sector will be less empowered if we adopted such a motto.

Instead, we’ve said no, the social sector has higher legitimacy, and our playbook is just to, I don’t know, make their fact-checking results fun and amplify their voices by the end of the day is the Taiwan FactCheck Center. It is the MyGoPen. It is CoFacts. It’s people in the social sector, including middle schoolers and primary schoolers fact-checking each and every sentence in our presidential debate and forum.

Because they are longer lasting than any four-year government, and they are more trustworthy than any surveillance capitalist. This empowerment of the not only research and academia, but also the social sector, including very young people, is at the core.

A framework about digital competence, not literacy. About media competence, not literacy. Meaning that people are no longer just receivers but co-producers of epistemic input. I think this is something that EU and Taiwan has a lot in common. In fact, we actually do learn from one another.

For example, when it comes to citizen consultation, our e-petition website is a carbon copy of the Better Reykjavik from Iceland. Our participatory budget portal learned a lot from the Barcelona and the Madrid models. Our digital consultation platform, vTaiwan, learned a lot from the digital République Numérique from the French government. Also their national consultations, and so on, we also watch very closely, and so on.

There’s a natural affinity of empowering the social sector through co-creation against the infodemic.

This is really interesting, because where I struggle most is when people ask me, oh, so you’re saying Europe and Taiwan should cooperate in what, how? Give us exactly your suggestions, because Europe and China relations, it’s business as usual. European countries do not want to engage openly with Taiwan, because they fear that there will be consequences to their businesses.

You mean on democratic consultation, like the PRC has better democratic consultation tool they want to sell? I don’t think so. [laughs]

No, no, no, but that’s what I’m trying to say, that exactly as you point out, that this element is at the core of the Taiwan model, and we are natural partners. On the European side, because we’ve already opened, we said that Russia and China are the biggest source of disinformation throughout the pandemic. In June, I think, this year, we put this report out on a European level that was backed by all the member states.

This was seen as a revolutionary approach, because never before have we said that China is also the major source. About Russia, we’ve said that before. Our relations with Russia and China are different for obvious reasons. The proximity, the Baltic States and Poland feel Russia’s breathing on their neck on a daily basis. Relations are different.

Now that I’m inspired by your views on the misinformation, disinformation, countering that, how we should work more closely together on that front, I think that’s one very good element. Also, the trust, as you described the…The people feel that it’s not the government that it’s fact-checking, but it’s government empowering them to fact-check themselves.

I don’t know how it is in Taiwan in the public mind, in the public mind of the people on the street, whether they really understand the nuances of disinformation and the implications. I think in Europe, this is not yet clear.

Yeah, because you’re subject to it later than we are.

Of course.

The PRC has been saying for decades that they can take care of Taiwan’s 23 million people’s health in the World Health Organization. That’s disinformation, and we’ve been subject to that in decades.

My point is that it’s not just about the vaccination against disinformation, like getting the cute spokesdogs into everybody’s mind, or recently I also role-played Doraemon. [laughs] Anyway, it’s not just about the vaccination.

It’s also about the testing, that’s the fact-checking, and it’s also about the cure, and that is the kind of digital tools that we work with the global platform economy providers such as Facebook to make sure that there is, for example, real-time open data when it comes to election related social and political targeted advertisement. You really need to nip it in the bud.

You really need to say foreign people just should not make precision advertisements during our election season. They also conformed starting last year.

The vaccination, the testing, and the cure, I think are all important. We are happy to share just as we shared the biological versions of vaccination, testing, and cure.

The next piece that I write while I am here should be to elaborate a little bit more on this. I think in Europe, people don’t really understand, just simply, they don’t know how much and in what ways Taiwan, in that collaborative approach between the government and civil society really fights disinformation. I would really love, myself, to write more about this for a European audience.

Sure, sure, the infodemiology. [laughs]

Yeah. You also use the infodemic term. The High Representative, Josep Borrell, he was quite vocal on the need to fight against disinformation. You are familiar with the battle on narratives.

Yes.

After the Chinese leadership really sent all the help to Italy, and they tried to prove that it is not democratic governance that can successfully fight the virus, but it is their strong, authoritarian response. This is why we also say that China is a systemic rival. They try to put forward an alternative model of governance. I think that makes it even more urgent that we work with democratic countries as Taiwan in the region, because Europe remains a distant actor.

We understand that the United States is Taiwan’s number one and most important ally. We also are happy to see that President Tsai’s ambition, aspiration and not only but in real terms, the administration is looking at reinforcing ties with South East Asian countries in the New Southbound Policy. We understand that she focuses on people to people first but beyond that as well. India is getting more attention.

For that reason, I think this is the moment that we push from a European perspective. I hope that whatever Europeans do on the ground such as myself to give more visibility, I would love it if we could maybe think about this in the future, how we could…Your voice has such weight in Taiwanese social sector, as you call it.

Thank you. [laughs]

I like that. I like that term. I would be so appreciative if you could maybe bring more Europe in the discussion.

Definitely.

Especially as we just discussed this infodemic, fighting the infodemic, not just the virus, as such, but the information given China’s implications of influence in Europe. Maybe we can tweet about this after.

Yeah, we could. We could. There’s plenty of material. Joe has it all. There was an early September meeting called “Digital Democracy – What Europe Can Learn From Taiwan,” which is on YouTube and also a transcript hosted by Dominik Hierlemann. Also, there’s, of course, Taiwan’s own counter-disinformation playbook. It’s in English. I can also get Joe a copy. I wrote a blog about trusting the citizens for both the infodemic and the epidemic.

There’s plenty of material to work with, and I’m happy to tweet about it.

Thank you, thank you. I like it how you say you trust the citizens, because in Europe, you always say trust the government. We don’t talk about how the government trusts its citizens. We always talk about not trusting the government.

Not only because of the failure of COVID response, I think in Belgium. It is very sad to see how fragmented the country is. As a given, it is a federal state. This is not the sad part of the story. The complexity of it means that you have different plan for restrictions in place for the different regions, and they overlap and they clash.

People are just completely distrustful of the authorities, because they said that they don’t have a plan, that it’s a complete failure. We don’t have the experience of SARS as some Asian countries have had and learned from. Maybe this is our SARS.

Exactly. Our municipal and central government were saying completely different things in 2003 too.

Hmm.

Yeah.

And you’ve learned?

And we’ve learned.

That’s why you have a central epidemic control…

That’s right. Command Center.

Yes, the Command Center. I’ve a very good example when I go back to Europe to say that it works, because first of all, I could come to Taiwan in spite of what is happening. I was closely monitored, and I had no problem with that, because it was for my own good and my own health and for the health of the community.

I have an issue with Europeans being so…even today, even after all these months of dealing with the pandemic, still not wanting to wear a mask. They’re still taking that as something that violates their personal freedom, like in the United States.

With this, of course, I think we need to look deeper in why we have such a…

Yeah, but I think it also has something to do with how masks are advertised in the first place. When you say it’s protecting you from your own unwashed hands. First, it’s individualistic, and also it avoids all the unnecessary debate exactly how much does it protect against a respiratory disease.

When we came up with this idea, “Masks are here to protect against your own unwashed hands,” the idea about asymptomatic transmission, about aerosol, and so on, all these are just being investigated. It was really early. It was January, early February. Nobody disputes that if you touch a surface and put your face to your own hands, that’s a very likely vehicle of transmission, and masks stop that and then reminds you to wash your hands.

WHO at the time was saying that don’t wear a mask, because you can lead to a false sense of security, and then you probably wouldn’t wash your hands as much. That’s the main problem of that. They are not wrong. It’s the same research, you just interpret it in two different ways. You either say you don’t trust the citizens, so don’t bother with the masks, or you say you trust the citizens, so wear a mask to remind yourself to wash your hands, and we chose the latter to a very good effect.

One side of the coin is government trusting citizens. The other side is citizens trusting the government. This side in Europe, as I said, is very low. In Taiwan, it is very high.

Yeah. To give no trust is to get no trust. It’s very simple. We also thank the people who do not trust their government. For example, the quarantine measures we just talked about. There’s many people who are OK with it, but there were nine percent of people not OK with it. They found some parliamentarians who did a public hearing. We have no emergency state. Everything we do must be pre-approved by the parliament.

In the interpolation, the Department of Cyber Security explained the digital fence very clearly and saying that after 14 days, there’s no constitution basis for the data to be kept, so you don’t have to worry about advertisements targeting you or whatever.

Also, the telecoms have the data anyway, and they are processed within the telecom, just like the earthquake and flood warnings. Again, they are not shipping the data to any commercial vendor or anything like that.

After he explained all this, the approval rate grew to 94 percent. Three percent more people understood the explanation. We still thank the other six percent, because they keep us honest and accountable.

In Europe, people don’t…they really fear about their data being misused by the government.

Yeah, justifiably so.

Yes, of course. They think that the geolocation with the app, they download the app. But already, as you said, the telecom companies already have data…

Which is why we don’t introduce any apps. The telecoms already know, to a very rough degree, like 50-meters radius, where your phone is, but it doesn’t need to know which room you are in, which would be a breach of privacy norms.

The whole point is that we do not collect data that we were not already collecting before the pandemic. Then people understand, oh, of course, it’s not very precise, but of course, that’s all we need anyway. Just by reusing the data in a way that are pro-social instead of asking people to wear a Bluetooth dongle or something, with all due respect to Singaporeans.

Anything that is introduced after the pandemic is subject to more scrutiny, and for very good reason, because people did not know its security and privacy properties.

It really comes down to explaining the people that what you are doing is transparent and open, and the data management is not revolutionary different. It’s actually the same.

It’s the same data collectors, and it’s processed in the same data centers. If you worry about it, of course, we will give an account, but it’s not like that we collect new data.

I think this is another point that is crucial in the Taiwan model, to really explain in an open and transparent way and to communicate. Having daily press conferences, as Taiwan has had for months, that was not the case in Europe. It’s another very important element to pick out for Europe. I’m speaking…

I think New Zealand also did the same. They also have those briefings from the Quint, from the five medical offices.

I’m just being mindful of the time. I’m checking.

Sure, sure.

I don’t want to overstay my welcome here.

Uh-huh.

We discussed about what Europe can learn from the response. Oh, yes, how about Taiwan’s soft power as a concept? How do you see that concept in the post-pandemic world?

Basically, we just say “Taiwan can help” or “Taiwan is helping.” I think a lot of this idea of soft power was in contrast of the hard power in terms of military. It’s like a cultural response to a military situation.

Nowadays, when we say Taiwan can help, it’s something more. It’s not just about a culture which for all their goods, that bubble tea and so on, that showcases Taiwan. Of course, Xiaolongbao I guess also helps, because it’s innovative and is really good. [laughs]

The point is that in more serious topics, we talk about data governance, open government, social innovation, and so on. All these, Taiwan can also help. It extends beyond the idea of soft power, which is why I translate Taiwan can help to Mandarin as 暖實力 or warm power. We don’t say warm power in English, because it sounds like climate change.

But that’s the idea, it’s the power to help and with no strings attached. This with no strings attached is the main distinguishing factor, because when we do open innovation, like literally every innovation that I described to you countering pandemic infodemic, it only gets stronger if more people practice it.

It’s not a rival good. It’s a communal, common good. It’s in our best interest to relinquish all the copyrights, trademarks, patents, whatever around it. I think that’s a defining character. I would say that Taiwan’s soft power nowadays is more defined by open innovation than any particular product or process.

You see challenges to it because of the…or do you see more opportunity, of course, with the pandemic unfolding?

Opportunities, for sure, because open innovation thrives if more people engage in a digital commons. The pandemic has convinced even the people who 10 or 20 years ago had a really bad experience with video conferencing to reevaluate the digital commons, and found that it’s actually pretty good nowadays.

We get to meet more senior journalists, more senior decision makers over the cyberspace, simply because we can see each other more clearly. If we meet face-to-face, we have to wear masks. [laughs]

The point is that the diplomatic norm has changed. It used to be quite a stir when I spoke through a telepresence robot at UN Geneva building in the Internet Governance Forum, to the protest of the PRC ambassador, but he did not leave the room, and my words are on the record. It’s a new norm.

According to a certain UN resolution, if they cannot expel our representatives from a UN meeting, they have to leave the room, because One-China and all that, but then by tacitly agreeing in the room and for me to finish my talk, it means that they don’t see this robot as a representative of Taiwan. It’s rather re-presenting, [laughs] like literally presenting like a PowerPoint presentation, of Taiwan.

I think these norms are now being reinforced by those video conferencing meetings, by immersive realities, extended realities. When everybody is just a rectangle, there’s no member’s seat or observer’s seat, and so on.

I think multi-stakeholderism, and it’s augmenting multilateralism. While Taiwan has no seat in the Westphalian arrangement in many organizations, those same organizations are becoming hybrid, like also multi-stakeholder.

When I enter the UN Geneva building, my robot entered without requiring a passport, bypassing the multilateral norm, but once they’re in the Internet Governance Forum, that works on the multi-stakeholder norm, and of course, we are a stakeholder to the Internet. My name card actually has no country name on it, but just a domain name.

Obviously, .tw resolves to my machine, not a machine in Shanghai or in Beijing, and so the stakeholder status is undisputed. Even if you typed this web address from Shanghai or Beijing, it goes to this machine. [laughs] It doesn’t go to their machine. That part is not Westphalian, but it is still multi-stakeholder. I think the opportunities that people will think in a more multi-stakeholder kind of way to tackle truly global problems.

Whereas the pandemic is maybe the first truly global problem that has the same level of urgency more or less in all countries…

But of course, as you just mentioned, the infodemic, the data norms like climate change, all these are also in the same category or truly global problems that can only be tackled in a multi-stakeholder instead of just multilateral fashion. I think this is tremendous opportunity for Taiwan.

What is the biggest challenge to switching to this new reality?

To this new norm, right?

Yeah.

I already mentioned, if people subscribe to authoritarian intelligence, if people think AI, and think the state should know everything, then this model doesn’t have a breathing room, because all the data will belong to the state.

Also, if surveillance capitalism expands unchecked, if the surveillance capitalists say that they know the people better than the people know themselves, so why bother with people power or collective intelligence, the AI can predict everything, then there’s little room for the social sector too.

Basically, for the social sector to grow as a sector, we need to think beyond it being the third sector, otherwise the other two sectors still dominate.

For the social sector to work, I think there need to be a tacit understanding that there is strength in plurality, and if the plurality is the strength, then the social sector maximizes strength and maximizes the communicational powers of the various plural actors, whereas a single state or a single multinational company would just be more homogeneous.

If we truly believe plurality is power, and diversity and inclusion are needed, then the social sector need to be the dominant sector.

Then I would say that part of the Taiwan model as a core element is empowering the social sector.

Exactly, yes.

Like a conclusion to everything you said.

Definitely.

Other than the more tangible elements about the data, and how exactly Taiwan is doing to fight the pandemic, but a more abstract but very important element would be this empowering the social sector.

Yeah. I would even say it’s the social-sector-first approach. Maybe we call it the 0th sector. [laughs]

In light of the growing US-China tension, how realistic do you think the prospect that Taiwan could define its future for itself? How realistic do you see this? How can Europe help? Maybe that could be our last question.

Sure. First of all, I think as I said, Taiwan offers a third way outside of this state-knows-everything or the companies-knows-everything dilemma. In this vein, we show every person on the planet really that you don’t need to trade economic growth to public health or the other way around.

It’s very realistic, because we make this argument without alluding to US-China tension. This argument has nothing to do with the US-China tension. This argument is profoundly universal, and so I’m optimistic about it.

How could Europe help? I guess the Europe can be resilient and hold to the humanistic tradition of empowering not only individual human dignity, which is what EU is all about anyway, but also the social sector. That is to say, not just individual’s dignity, but individual as association, individual as unity, individual as unions, but still plural, like many different joint data controllers in GDPR parlance.

Taiwan has many such data coalitions already around AirBox, which is for environmental measurements. The Civil IoT system, the collaborative fact-checking system, and so on. All these are the kind of joint data controllership that GDPR is designed to empower.

Whereas the EU is still figuring out how to make such data co-ops/unions work, we already have some working models. You can help by first of all list us as case studies, and also the other way around to when we are negotiating for GDPR adequacy, which we are doing so right now, and also think about how the key GDPR clauses can also have a Taiwanese contribution and interpretation.

That’s very interesting. Also, what I find fascinating is, in Europe, the debate about what to do about COVID-19 or the pandemic is it’s the economy or human…

Yeah. It’s a false dilemma.

But it’s so difficult to break away from that, because they will say, OK, we have a lockdown in many European countries now.

I know.

Then the reaction is, OK, our economy will suffer, but that’s not the priority. The Taiwanese priority has always been to protect human health.

Yes, and also to empower the social sector, namely the community pharmacists that are trusted by the elders, and also to make sure our mask rationing are the same experience as renewing chronic prescriptions, and so on.

It’s with a lot of care put into empowering the existing social relationships, because we understand that’s the only way that people would voluntarily devise new ideas – using traditional rice cookers to disinfect a mask and all that – without any top-down measurement.

I think we’ve covered most things. Thank you so much.

Thank you.

It was really a pleasure to get access to you and to your views. As I mentioned, 9DashLine is really trying to do more to connect Europe with Asia. I was wondering if you can refer me to any entity here in Taiwan in the civil sector that I could connect with actors who would be interested in…

Sure. Joe has the complete list, actually more complete than me.

Maybe if I approach some entities, I can…

Sure, sure, you can CC me. You can CC me.

I can CC you. I have your email.

Yeah, yeah, you can CC my email. You have all my three cards, all with the same email.

Same email, yes. OK.

All right, thank you.

Thank you so much.

Thank you.

We should do a picture.