It is up to each user to choose who they trust . It is also up to each user to choose reputable vendors that have a good privacy policy. I certainly wouldn’t say that the nationality is the only or even a major indicator. There’s many other indicators. The lack of a privacy policy, for me, is a huge red flag.
Again, for the agency, it address the problem of them not able to communicate these requirement very quickly to their vendors, and then bring them with real gifts. Again, this is a way to engender trust . This idea, once we brief them in the cross-ministerial meeting, actually every ministry’s MIS has heard of this story, because they receive those reports.
...the idea of this as a trust -building thing is also of interesting tool. There’s so much that I didn’t realize before today that is fundamentally about the transformation of relationship. It’s not just problem solving. It’s a way in which the problem solving activity is, as you might put it, Audrey, an excuse for people to meet.
Engaging people with the trust of the tool or society, and for us, the importance is in young people having this kind of, "You can be expressed. What is your narrative, and what do you hope for society? Or maybe you don’t want to engage, but you’re still a part of society. You never live isolated." We use that by...
You don’t want to do this all the time, get into the weeds, and really dive deep, and look at something, but you might want to do that once in a while. I would assume, if I take a weekend, and take a deep, deep dive, and really can see it, that’s going to lead to a lot of trust .
I’m very happy also that our Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered it is worthwhile for me to go to Korea to approve this trip, and I really treasure it. As for my keynote, I will be talking about open government, which is my main work in Taiwan, and how we use information technology to increase trust between government and its people.
And the reason why is LLMs, or generative AI in general, do the most damage when they destroy the mutual trust that is existing in the society, on the actor level, when you pick up the phone and you hear your friends and family’s voice, but it’s actually a voice clone bot that want you to buy some cryptocurrency that is destroying the trust on the actor layer, not the content layer, by shape shifting attacks that can carry out intimate conversations, addictive ones, even with many people, in whichever voice they do…
In the economic sphere, it maximized profit efficiency. Of course, it led to growth, but the externalities are inflicted on the people and the planet. Of course, it’s been incredibly successful on some abstract number of terms, immense wealth, but it has reached its absolute limits, as we know here, causing environmental crises, geopolitical conflicts, and the erosion of social fabric trust .
We also build resilience (e.g., fallback to microwave and LEO/MEO satellites if subsea cables are cut). All three hyperscalers engage with Taiwan: AWS launched a Taipei region in June 2025; Microsoft announced plans for a local Azure region; Google Cloud already operates the Asia‑East1 (Taiwan) region. As chip production globalizes, we export trusted tech and supply‑chain resilience with it.
Yes. Basically when all the trusted , not just officials, but also private sector players and so on in Taiwan switched to those short numbers, like 111 or three code, four code, and so on, the legacy 10 code, the full mobile number, if it’s not in your contact list, maybe people will just shift the default to say this is “likely scam.”
In fact, maybe that is the only legible formal speech afterwards and everything else will be a bot. Everything else will be relegated to a bot. It’s a kind of different expectation, a zero- trust expectation. But I think leading up to our presidential election next January, we have to make such preparations. And next year, like many jurisdictions, have their elections.
Yeah of course, and also a shared posture. The posture is zero trust architecture. Everyone in the private sector is facing state-sponsored attacks. It’s not like those state-sponsored attacks will see you’re a dot com, so will not attack you because of, I don’t know, the Tallinn Manual’s rules of engagement or whatever. They don’t care.
I would first say that we need, including the GDPR, the foundational trust to independent bodies. I would also say that the contextualizing services – I have in mind the international fact-checking network, the Community Notes in Twitter – that is far better than lockdowns or takedowns when it comes to get the antibody of the mind, the awareness, the media competence of citizens.
I think really it’s a case of “there’s a crack in everything, and that’s how the light gets in.” This initial experience, we can certainly call it a mistake. This initial mistake led to the conversations that enhance everybody understanding about what does it take to configure a cloud service so that it’s safe, reliable, trustworthy , and so on.
At pol.is is a computational democracy platform that makes sure that people can host it anywhere. You can run pol.is on your own computer because it’s free software. You can host it in somewhere that you trust your cooperative, your school, and so on. It’s open source, you can change it however you want, tune it however you want.
It makes defense much more likely to be joined by different vendors. Maybe this layer provided by Microsoft, that layer by Amazon, that layer by Google, that layer by VMware, or whatever other companies. These large IT companies, each taking care of the layer that they’re most familiar with, join us together in a joint cyber defense through ZTA, zero trust architecture.
Because of that, when you’re queuing in line, you can check, in real time, the person queuing before you, how many masks did they actually buy. The pharmacists have a lot of trustworthiness , because they keep the system running, but so did anyone who procure some mask from the nearby pharmacy, because they are, in essence, part of the national auditing team.
It seems as though I had been naively hoping that there would be some contact tracing consensus here, if not in the US, at least maybe in California or on the West Coast, or something. It seems as though people’s immediate jump into our state and federal governments cannot be trusted with our data. There’s going to be a central database.
That is is really fun. And this stuff always happens a little bit like this. So they just create a project and also the electronic ID – also Renat Künzi mentioned it, I read it.. That is also done, in our opinion, in a wrong way which will lead to identity theft, trust issues, and stuff like that. So this… this is systematic there.
It’s not necessarily personal information. This is mostly just a virus that uses our trusting relationship as a way to propagate. Just like chain mail, this is not a new thing. Because of that, when we flag a piece of information as spam, we’re not saying that we’re sending the entire chat history to Cofact. This is not what happened.
