Bye.

Thank you so much, Minister. Thank you.

That is an open space, right?

Can I have a quick look?

Thank you, Minister. One last question. Is this your office?

Thank you. When I was in Taiwan two years ago, I felt like the overall atmosphere was quite pessimistic. People were talking about either there’s going to be a quick death by invasion or maybe a long, slow strangulation by economic infiltration and so on. The events in the past ...

At least looking at the cyber disinformation, do you feel like in Taiwan there is a very strong sense of urgency that society has to counter Chinese efforts?

Thank you so much. Going back to military threats, how imminent do you personally think is the risk of military escalation anytime soon? People are speculating when China will make its threats come through.

Thank you so much. Some countries, including Germany, are still hesitant to ban Huawei completely from its 5G networks. Looking at the whole 5G debate, what do you think about Europe’s approach? Are governments in Europe still too naïve?

Thank you so much. When you see how Western countries deal with Chinese cyber disinformation, do you see any particular blind spot? Is there anything that Western countries can learn from Taiwan’s example?

Is there any way for you to assess how successful you have been to combat Chinese disinformation?

Can you explain the concept of nerd immunity?

This fact-checking center that you mentioned, is it affiliated to your ministry directly?

How do I imagine the people in your ministry dealing with this two-hour rule on a day-to-day basis? There’s big teams of people just scanning the Internet content, and they’re getting certain alerts for certain keywords?

Is this two-hour rule something you have set up?

You say that pace is a decisive factor. How fast do you and your participation officers aim at combating this disinformation?

Do you have a certain task force or department in your ministry specifically targeted at China’s information war?

Would you say the Chinese efforts have been successful in at least parts, maybe some parts of the population more susceptible to their messages, maybe older people who don’t know how to use social media, who are more easily influenced?

China has a lot of money, a lot of manpower, a lot of resources for cyber warfare. What kind of advantage does a small democracy like Taiwan have to combat these efforts?

What do you know about the resources Beijing has put in place specifically targeted at Taiwan?

They would never answer that, so [laughs] I thought maybe you…

How closely do cyber departments in China work with their proxies maybe based in Taiwan, local allies, local helpers?

You say these efforts have been around for a while, decades. What make them dangerous still? Taiwan people are aware of Beijing’s propaganda.

If there’s nothing covert about it but it has been out in the open, how dangerous are these infiltration efforts for Taiwan’s society at all?

How sophisticated are these attacks? How do you and your team analyze these attacks? Where are they coming from? How big of a cyber army they have in Beijing? What departments are involved?

OK. As China has been ramping up its military threats, I wonder, besides the danger of a forceful invasion, what kind of accompanying efforts has Beijing undertaken in the digital sphere? Have these efforts been noticeably stepped up recently?

…the official term…

Understand. I’m just…

OK.

Force an “reunification.”

The focus of my article is China’s efforts to force a reunification with Taiwan.